Equality\u27s Understudies by Huq, Aziz Z.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 118 Issue 6 
2020 
Equality's Understudies 
Aziz Z. Huq 
University of Chicago Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Law 
and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aziz Z. Huq, Equality's Understudies, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1027 (2020). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol118/iss6/7 
https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.118.6.equality 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 





PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION. By
Robert L. Tsai. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2019.
Pp. 276. $27.95.
INTRODUCTION
Our Republic these days is riven by divides about what equality de-
mands of us as private and public actors. Consider just a few recent exam-
ples:
• Harvard University is challenged in federal court for preferring
African Americans over other racial minorities, especially Asian
Americans, in their admissions pool.1 Harvard’s flagship law re-
view, meanwhile, faces its own suit over its preferment of minori-
ty candidates.2
• Virginia’s Governor Ralph Northam and its Attorney General
Mark Herring are swept up into political controversy by news that
both dressed in “blackface” during their medical school or college
days, respectively.3 The historical significance of “blackface” is
pivotal to these debates; the fact that Northam and Herring are
white forms a necessary predicate to the controversy.
• President Donald Trump issues an executive order restricting en-
try to the United States by nationals of several Muslim-majority
countries.4 The order is challenged several times in federal court
* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law and Mark C. Mamolen Teaching
Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. The Frank J. Cicero, Jr., Fund supported this writ-
ing. My thanks to Andrew Lanham, Sarah McDonald, and Haley Dutch for their terrific and
insightful editing work. All errors are mine.
1. Hua Hsu, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, NEW YORKER (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/15/the-rise-and-fall-of-affirmative-action
[https://perma.cc/LWG3-B357]; see also Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fel-
lows of Harvard Coll. (Harvard Corp.), No. 14-cv-14176-ADB, 2019 WL 4786210 (D. Mass.
Sept. 30, 2019).
2. Bob Van Voris, Harvard Law Review Suit Opens New Front in Admissions-Bias
Fight, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2018, 12:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
10-08/harvard-law-review-suit-opens-new-front-in-admissions-bias-fight (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
3. Jonathan Martin & Alan Blinder, Second Virginia Democrat Says He Wore Blackface,
Throwing Party into Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06
/us/politics/virginia-blackface-mark-herring.html [https://perma.cc/VHR2-QUCZ].
4. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2442 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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as a discriminatory policy at odds with the equal protection com-
ponent of the Fifth Amendment.5 Immigration-related deference
doctrines, however, preclude close scrutiny of the intentions ani-
mating the order.6 In part because it employs a nationality-based
criterion rather than a faith-based criterion on its face, a revised
order is ultimately upheld.7
• A proposal by Massachusetts Senator and presidential hopeful
Elizabeth Warren to impose a “wealth tax” is immediately con-
demned as a reflection of mere “resentment” and “envy” by the
less well-off.8 Warren’s putatively egalitarian proposal is also at-
tacked on the ground that it will fail to address its stated target—
economic inequality.9
Each of these national controversies turns on a claim for equality or an alle-
gation that a person or institution has failed to honor the command of
equality. Although they have been selected from a narrow band of time, they
nonetheless evince the heterogeneity of equality-based arguments presently
tendered in the public sphere. Often, albeit not inevitably, equality argu-
ments in public debate are entangled with legal or constitutional arguments.
But no one partisan formation holds a monopoly on equality talk. Just like
identity politics more generally,10 equality claims are articulated on all sides
of the ideological spectrum of American politics. An objection from “equali-
ty” can therefore channel a varied and incongruous array of challenges to le-
gal, personal, and institutional arrangements. And it can be leveled by a
motley crowd of conservatives, libertarians, liberals, and progressives. We
are thus bound together by a conceptual vocabulary even as we are divided
in its applications.
The idea that equality is a deeply plural concept is not new.11 The related
idea that equality standing alone is indeterminate,12 however, and hence
5. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017).
6. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–19 (majority opinion); Washington v. Trump,
847 F.3d at 1167 (addressing plaintiffs’ claim that the order violates the equal protection guar-
antee).
7. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (upholding the executive order). For a detailed
account of the litigation, see Aziz Z. Huq, Article II and Antidiscrimination Norms, 118 MICH.
L. REV. 47 (2019).
8. Tyler Cowen, Resentment of the Wealthy Is Not a Policy, BLOOMBERGOPINION (Feb.
1, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-01/warren-wealth-
tax-resentment-is-not-a-policy (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
9. Daniel Hemel, Elizabeth Warren’s Wealth Tax on the Super-Rich Is the Wrong Solu-
tion to the Right Problem, TIME (Jan. 30, 2019), http://time.com/5516903/elizabeth-warren-
wealth-tax-income-assets/ [https://perma.cc/ZD7N-VKNV].
10. Cf. ASAD HAIDER, MISTAKEN IDENTITY: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 44
(2018) (noting that the “primordial” form of race is the “white race”).
11. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 132 (1981) (“Equality splits itself into
many distinct notions, each an element in its grammar.”); infra text accompanying notes 18–
34. In separate work, I have argued that the narrower term “discriminatory intent” is also char-
acterized by irresolvable pluralism. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103
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must be specified and clarified rather than simply being taken as a given, has
been gaining ground in recent years. This is in part the result of several scru-
pulous studies by political theorists and legal scholars looking at equality and
the related concept of discrimination from a range of different angles.13 By
contrast, the idea that equality is dispensable for moral and ethical critique
and for public policy reform is not a familiar proposition. It is rather a novel
and challenging idea. Yet that is the core claim of Robert L. Tsai’s Practical
Equality: Forging Justice in a Divided Nation.14 Tsai’s central proposal to dis-
card equality as an otiose criterion for legal and political strategy is at once
surprising and also provocative in itself. That it should come from a respect-
ed and accomplished progressive scholar makes the book even more note-
worthy, and even more worthy of close consideration.
My aim in this Review is to examine closely Tsai’s idea that equality is a
dispensable term in contemporary legal, ethical, and political debate. Such a
claim clearly cannot rest on an observation of equality’s rhetorical disutility
or its irrelevance to observed debates. Plainly, many commentators of differ-
ent ideological camps believe it to be an indispensable concept. Rather, Tsai’s
claim must hinge on the prediction that some set of normative goals is better
achieved by abandoning equality talk in favor of substitutes. This indeed is
his approach. As I read the book, he aims in effect to short-circuit difficult
theoretical inquiries by asking directly how equality values are best advanced
on the ground. Specifically, instead of embarking on the controversial and
conceptually arduous task of specifying the material conditions or moral co-
ordinates of equality, Tsai proposes that we abandon that “quest” (p. 230). In
its place, he suggests, we should work for “a form of pragmatism to protect
our progress on equality and to find other ways of doing justice when we
have trouble agreeing to do it explicitly” (p. 37). To lend substance to this
CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1240–65 (2018) (identifying five different species of discriminatory in-
tent in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
12. The canonical formulation by Peter Westen asserts that “equality is entirely
‘[c]ircular.’ It tells us to treat like people alike; but when we ask who ‘like people’ are, we are
told they are ‘people who should be treated alike.’ Equality is an empty vessel with no substan-
tive moral content of its own.” Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV.
537, 547 (1982) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). Westen’s position was immediately
contested. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1167, 1168 (1983) (distinguishing formal and substantive conceptions of equality, and suggest-
ing that only the former fall within Westen’s argument, and then only imperfectly).
13. Among the leading recent works are ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF
INTEGRATION (2010); BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT (2015);
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008); TARUNABH KHAITAN, A
THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (2015); and T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY
MATTER? (2018). All of these works are deeply insightful, and reward sustained study. Note
also that these works concern both the concepts of “equality” and “discrimination,” which
seem related, but need not be identical. Discrimination, for example, might be a failure of
equality (e.g., racial animus). Alternatively, they may be functionally conjoined such that the
practice of equality requires acts of discrimination (e.g., the accommodation of those with dis-
abilities, and only them, in academic testing contexts).
14. Robert Tsai is a Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
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broad proposal, Tsai develops in granular detail four alternatives for equali-
ty: due process, minimal rationality, anticruelty, and free speech (p. 7). I will
call these equality’s proposed understudies. They can be understood as legal
or ethical claims, or even less ambitiously as political slogans. In either ca-
pacity, they are to be yoked to the pikes of lawyers and party leaders in lieu
of equality talk as they charge into battle. In Tsai’s view, the best way to sus-
tain and even advance equality is to abandon direct talk or action oriented
toward it and instead to take on the garb, however ill-suited, of its four un-
derstudies. Equality talk itself, he intimates, can be disregarded as functional-
ly unfit to the task at hand.
Even if one does not embrace his view—and for reasons I hope to make
plain, I don’t—Tsai’s bracing polemic for equality’s redundancy casts fresh
light on familiar terrain. Fifty-odd years ago, arguments against the desegre-
gation of schools hinged on the perceived risk of “mingling” of the races and
the attendant downfall of the “Southern white race.”15 Today, the same ar-
guments about racial purity—and, by implication, racial hierarchy—are
proffered in defense of the harsh and selective enforcement of immigration
law against migrants on the southern (but not northern) border.16 Now, as
then, with the political headwinds seemingly pressing against emancipatory
change, there are many progressives and liberals who would seek shelter in
any port. Tsai’s offer of alternative instruments to achieve equality will seem
timely and needful to such readers. Although Tsai does not draw upon it, the
history of political thought also provides ballast for his argument. It was not
until the eighteenth century that claims about equal entitlements based on a
common humanity became a lodestar for political action and arguments.17 If
equality is indeed an innovation in political thought, there may be no reason
to maintain it as a central term. Practical Equality therefore serves as an op-
portunity for discerning precisely what work the term “equality” does that its
understudies cannot in the pursuit of broadly left-liberal projects related to
the establishment of a just polity. While I resist the idea that equality can be
abandoned as a central term of legal or political debate, and while I query its
fungibility with other moral ideals, I nonetheless walk away from Tsai’s work
with many valuable insights. Even if it does not persuade all of its readers,
Practical Equality still provides a valuable opportunity to consider how
equality can most effectively be deployed.
15. Anders Walker, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimina-
tion as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399, 401 (1997).
16. See Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy,
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 198 (2019) (“The President’s statements and policies suggest that
he views U.S. national identity in racial terms and seeks to preserve the nation’s predominantly
white identity.”). For Tsai’s views on contemporary white nationalism, see pp. 219–28.
17. Certainly, the idea that all are entitled to equal shares of some good, be it opportuni-
ty, wealth, or resources, is a relatively recent one. SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT HISTORY
OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 2 (2004) (challenging the idea that disputes about the meaning of
distributive justice go back to the classical period, and instead positing an Enlightenment
origin).
April 2020] Equality’s Understudies 1031
This Review proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes Tsai’s core claim
and situates it in the context of ongoing political and legal developments.
Part II then critiques Tsai’s claim by evaluating his use of equality and the
adequacy of his proposed understudies. I suggest that none of these under-
studies can do the salutary work Tsai hopes. In particular, I argue that the
failures of human sympathy that consistently undermine the progressive
equality project (a project to which Tsai plainly subscribes—as do I) will
equally puncture the proposed understudies. A final, brief Part III reconsid-
ers how equality might be analyzed and deployed as a regulative ideal in
modern American politics and law.
I. EQUALITY AND ITSALTERNATIVES
An inquiry into the “practical” use of equality needs a threshold defini-
tion of equality. Tsai defines equality to mean that “individuals in similar
circumstances ought to be treated the same” (p. 8). This definition is reveal-
ing in one way. But it is opaque along other margins.
It is revealing in the sense of showing that Tsai takes individuals to be
the objects of equality. This excludes the thought that groups might be the
proper object of solicitude, otherwise known as “bloc-regarding equality.”18
It also rules out the possibility that the appropriate object of egalitarian con-
cern is the basic structure of society, famously defined in the Rawlsian tradi-
tion as “the major political, economic, and social institutions that make
fruitful social cooperation possible and that apportion the benefits and bur-
dens of such cooperation.”19 Some scholars mining the Rawlsian version of
liberalism have refined John Rawls’s principles of justice into a demand that
sounds in the register of equality. For instance, the philosopher Tommie
Shelby has powerfully argued in a Rawlsian register for the deep wrongful-
ness of “ghettos”—that is, pockets of concentrated economic, social, and le-
gal disadvantage that systematically undermine the lifecycle opportunities of
particular subsets of the population.20
Tsai’s quintessentially liberal and individualist focus also rules out cer-
tain policies and ambitions from an egalitarian agenda a priori. For example,
Senator Warren’s aspiration to create a more level economic playing field or
Harvard’s (alleged) ambition to create an educational environment in which
several racial groups have a meaningful presence in the form of a “critical
mass”21 of students do not plainly count as egalitarian.22 Claims in the Marx-
18. RAE ET AL., supra note 11, at 36–38, 43 (“A claim of equality for two or more subject
classes, equality being required between these classes (blocs) and not within them.”). A variant
is segmental equality, by which all those within a certain class must be treated equally, even if
different classes are treated differently. Id. at 43.
19. TOMMIE SHELBY, DARKGHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT, ANDREFORM 20 (2016).
20. Id. at 47.
21. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334–36 (2003).
22. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2, 8–9. I say “allegedly” because I have no
sense of what the good folk at Harvard really believe.
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ian tradition against the basic economic arrangements of industrial, finan-
cial, or other mutations of capitalism all seem to fall outside Tsai’s definition,
too.23 With some effort, to be sure, one might fit an argument for an entitle-
ment to basic income into his understanding of equality. But the arguments
for basic income generally configure it as an instrument of larger, more sys-
temic social reform.24 Without meaning to sound judgmental here, I want to
stress the point that Tsai has defined “equality” in a way that rules out of
court a whole host of understandings that have historically fallen under that
rubric.25 This means that he does not address—indeed, does not have to ad-
dress—the circumstance in which a group- or structure-focused argument
about equality comes into conflict with an individual-based equality claim.
Affirmative action, of course, can be characterized in this fashion, as can
Senator Warren’s wealth tax. But the equality-centered nature of these con-
flicts about affirmative action and redistributive taxation are elided by Tsai’s
definition of equality.26 Clarity is bought at the cost of losing sight of certain
moral questions traditionally associated with the project of equality.
Even while embracing a liberal, individualistic framework, moreover,
Tsai’s definition gives us a very open-textured conception of equality, one
that is marred by numerous ambiguities. First, he deliberately offers no defi-
nition of what it means to be “in similar circumstances” and no definition of
what it means to be treated “the same.” A simple example of why this mat-
ters relates to pregnancy: Is the trait of “pregnancy” a relevant distinction be-
tween persons in respect to which claims of equality can arise in the first
23. On the centrality of equality to the Marxian tradition, see G.A. COHEN, SELF-
OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 6 (1995) (“Classical Marxists believed that economic
equality was both historically inevitable and morally right.”).
24. See generally Philippe Van Parijs, Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the
Twenty-First Century, 32 POL. & SOC’Y 7 (2004) (introducing this concept).
25. In some tension with this individual focus, Tsai occasionally makes assertions that
invite an inquiry into social structure. For instance, he writes that egalitarianism calls for ar-
guments that “presuppose a community based on mutual respect and to explain how a course
of action will allow individuals to live a morally rewarding life.” P. 14. Later, he worries about
the “state’s expanded capability to stratify individuals along all kinds of dimensions.” P. 230.
Setting aside the question whether it is wise to “presuppose” a decent social structure when
arguing in favor of a reform to that very end, I think that many of the arguments of this form
that might have force under present conditions would focus upon social structure and inter-
group relations, and not on individual entitlements.
26. He is also excused from dealing with problems that arise within group-based claims
of equality. For instance, it can be the case that two groups are equal in the sense that the medi-
an member of the group is treated the same (e.g., the average wage of a man and a woman in a
given industry are at parity), but that median members of each stratum of the group are treated
differently from the median members of the parallel stratum (e.g., the average wages of male
and female CEOs and janitors both diverge from their gender comparator group). For a formal
definition, see E.H. Simpson, The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables, 13 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y, SERIES B (METHODOLOGICAL) 238 (1951).
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instance? Or should it be subsumed within the categories of sex or gender?27
To the extent that questions of pregnancy impinge upon a domain of human
activity—say, control over reproductive capabilities, sexual relations, or la-
bor-force participation—is it even a domain in which claims of equality have
normative bite? Or is it a sphere of human activity in which the idea of
equality has no role to play? (Consider in this regard the role that race
should play in one’s choice of sexual partners; then repeat the exercise with
gender.28) If equality indeed is a relevant criterion of evaluation, who then is
“in similar circumstances” to a pregnant employee or applicant? A nonpreg-
nant employee without any other relevant conditions? Or a nonpregnant
employee with, say, a medical condition that imposes physical constraints
and a risk of absence, analogous to pregnancy? I don’t mean to suggest here
a specific answer here to these questions. Rather, I want to underscore the
point that even so basic a question as whether an employer can have a “no
pregnancy” rule consistent with equality raises a host of questions about how
a general and abstract principle of equality is to be linked to specific parame-
ters of human and social experience.
More generally, what counts as pertinent to equality under particular
factual circumstances must be identified and justified, and this requires some
sort of theory. As Douglas Rae explained in a seminal treatment of the sub-
ject, equality talk always and necessarily rests upon “an account of the ways
in which . . . judgments [of equality] form coherent patterns of similarity and
difference, consistency and contradiction.”29 Rae describes this as a grammar
of equality, insofar as it mediates the “basic structural problems lying be-
tween abstract and practical equalities.”30 Implicit in his argument is the
complementary concern that equality talk without a specification of a medi-
ating grammar, and a justification of that specification, has a hollow norma-
tive core. That is, in ascertaining what equality demands in a specific case,
almost all the normative and theoretical work is done in the putatively em-
pirical determinations about what units of comparison to use, what traits to
compare, and the like.
It’s not the case that there’s no way of answering these questions. The
philosopher T.M. Scanlon recently identified six different reasons that ine-
27. For the Supreme Court’s view, see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974)
(“Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteris-
tics.”).
28. One’s choice of sexual or romantic partner is often considered a domain free of the
demands of equality and nondiscrimination. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination:
The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009). But those
choices do have quite predictable political consequences that are, in a sense, salient to equality
norms. For a brilliant and heterodox discussion of these issues, see Amia Srinivasan, Does An-
yone Have the Right to Sex?, LONDON REV. BOOKS (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.lrb.co.uk/v40
/n06/amia-srinivasan/does-anyone-have-the-right-to-sex (on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view).
29. RAE ET AL., supra note 11, at 15 (emphasis omitted).
30. Id.
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quality might be deemed objectionable, ranging from its engendering of
“humiliating differences in status” to its origin in “economic institutions that
are unfair.”31 Lurking behind Scanlon’s taxonomy is a long and tangled de-
bate in political theory concerning the appropriate unit for evaluating equali-
ty. On one side of this debate are the so-called luck egalitarians, who take the
fundamental aim of equality to be the compensation of people for unde-
served bad luck.32 On the other side are those who argue for a relational un-
derstanding of equality, which seeks “the construction of a community of
equals” and “integrates principles of distribution with the expressive de-
mands of equal respect.”33 (Remember that language; we’ll come back to it.)
This is why the law professor Peter Westen, writing almost forty years ago,
complained about the “derivative, secondary” nature of equality as a norma-
tive touchstone and urged that it be abandoned in favor of plainer rights
talk.34
I think Tsai is fairly read to personally understand all these uncertainties
and unsettled questions. I see no reason to infer that he is simply assuming
them away because they are inconvenient. Rather than ignoring them, he
suggests that it is the very difficulty of settling this buzzing swarm of defini-
tional, “grammatical” questions (to invoke Rae’s useful terminology) that
provides a reason to avoid an excessive reliance on the term equality in the
first place. Tsai thus acknowledges, in an unmistakably worried tone of
voice, that equality is an “inescapably moral concept” (p. 23). He fears that a
“broad theory of equality” may well have “no real meaning” for the popula-
tions that it putatively benefits (p. 43). Theory, on his account, yields “few
satisfying or permanent resolutions” (p. 38). And “it’s just too easy to get
caught up in the minutiae of social differences” and hence “paralyzed by in-
action” (p. 103). (Note that this might be a problem of theory, or it might be
an indictment of a certain genre of practical identity politics.) Worse, at least
when it comes to racial equality, the psychological priming effect from the
nonwhite faces of inequality’s victims may “create new psychological and po-
litical roadblocks to legal change” (p. 144). Based on these concerns, and out
of a fear of “political resistance and blowback” against equality demands,35
Tsai contends that we should abandon the “quest for gorgeously rendered
concepts that can solve all of our problems at once” and instead “become
grittier in our disposition, while broadening our tactics” (p. 230).
At the same time as Tsai makes this tactical retreat from equality as an
explicit standard for lawyers or social movements, I do not read him as em-
bracing Westen’s counsel and abandoning equality talk entirely. I do think
Tsai is in favor of a direct and unmediated analysis of the underlying indi-
31. SCANLON, supra note 13, at 8–9.
32. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989).
33. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 289, 313
(1999).
34. Westen, supra note 12, at 542, 548.
35. See, e.g., p. 89 (detailing judicial efforts to abolish the death penalty).
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vidual interests, and corresponding harms, that equality theory endeavors to
systematize. Rather, he argues that a number of midlevel theory substitutes
are needed for equality talk because of the barriers and frictions that equality
talk is likely to induce (pp. 8–11). He invokes an American tradition of
pragmatism, in which (very roughly speaking) knowing about the world is
inseparable from acting within the world. He thus seeks to articulate “a form
of pragmatism to protect our progress on equality and to find other ways of
doing justice when we have trouble agreeing to do it explicitly” (pp. 37–40).
This formulation echoes an antifoundationalist strand of pragmatist think-
ing that rejects “the tacit presupposition of much of modern philosophy that
the rationality and legitimacy of knowledge require necessary founda-
tions.”36 But Tsai also borrows a pragmatist metaphor from William James
to the effect that “[i]f pragmatism is like a corridor, then the law of equality
provides the overarching structure” (p. 40). That is, Tsai’s is still a theory of
equality, simply “by other means” (p. 37). Correspondingly, his pragmatism
is fainthearted rather than full-throated. An open question necessarily re-
mains about what nonempty idea of equality his argument depends upon,
and how it is to be knitted into practical recommendations.
This incomplete turn from theory to “pragmatics” in turn drives the
main line of argument articulated in the book. The core of Tsai’s project is to
illuminate ways in which advocates of equality can frame and advance their
goals without provoking zero-sum partisan face-offs. Across the four main
chapters of the book, he identifies and fleshes out four different substitutes—
roughly modeled on due process claims, demands for minimal rationality, a
ban on cruel treatment, and an embrace of free speech rights—as alternatives
to (or understudies for) equality. Given the range of examples employed in
the book, I think Tsai is best read as proffering these understudies as not just
specifically legal arguments, which can be tethered to different constitutional
provisions in legal briefs, but instead as ethical orientations and rhetorical
moves in debates over public policy. But there is no precision on this point.
In respect to each of the four understudies, Tsai points to a historical in-
stance in which equality values were advanced indirectly by insisting on the
alternative value. Because the success of his overall argument depends on the
success of these understudies, I briefly summarize each of them. I will return
to evaluate some of their merits in the following Part.
First, Tsai’s chapter on “fair play” offers an idea roughly analogous to
constitutional due process. He focuses on landmark criminal procedure cas-
es such as Brown v. Mississippi37 and McCleskey v. Kemp.38 In these two cas-
es, the Supreme Court respectively embraced and then shied away from
procedural fairness–based rulings that tracked worries about racial animus
36. Richard J. Bernstein, The Resurgence of Pragmatism, 59 SOC. RES. 813, 813–15
(1992).
37. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
38. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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in the criminal justice system.39 Tsai points out that the black defendant in
McCleskey mentioned, but failed to advance, a due process claim in favor of
an emphasis on equal protection (p. 87). Tsai argues that this “omitted” due
process argument could have been a less destabilizing—and hence a more
attractive—basis for relief than any equality ground (p. 89). He also suggests
that due process arguments are generally preferable for the separate reason
that evidentiary questions are more easily addressed (p. 65). Discriminatory
motive is notoriously hard to prove, he notes, but the extrinsic facts about
how a case was handled will often be more readily available (p. 79). And even
when a discriminatory motive is in evidence, it will often be too costly for a
court to assign that label and to act accordingly (pp. 71–80).
The second equality understudy that Tsai offers is a demand for mini-
mal rationality. In general, Tsai contends, a reasonableness rule that searches
out “[w]eak justifications produced by hasty deliberation, or offered with ut-
ter contempt to the empirical reality of a situation,” will prove a capable sub-
stitute for equality (p. 98). His leading example is the Supreme Court’s
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,40 which over-
turned a municipality’s decision to exclude homes for people with intellectu-
al disabilities as arbitrary and irrational, and hence a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.41 Cleburne is the rare robust exercise of rational basis re-
view under that Clause.42 Although Tsai discusses the case’s history based on
the justices’ own papers, he omits one feature of those deliberations that
supports his account of the case as an instance of second-best reasoning: At
the insistence of then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court first reached the question
whether intellectual disability constitutes a suspect class and rejected this
possibility.43 But after this concession was made, Rehnquist was more open
to finding for the Cleburne plaintiffs on rational basis grounds.44 That is, the
fatal deployment of rationality review flowed from precisely the kind of sub-
stitution-friendly compromise Tsai endorses—a compromise predicated up-
on the concern among some officials at the prospect of a destabilizing surfeit
of valid challenges to state action.
Third, Tsai proposes an anticruelty rule. To illustrate, he invokes litiga-
tion concerning a late-nineteenth-century California ordinance requiring
closely shaved hair for incarcerated men.45 Neutral on its face, that law was
“understood by every one” to target Chinese men with a queue and was in-
39. See pp. 54–55 (discussing Brown); pp. 81–83 (discussingMcCleskey).
40. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
41. Pp. 93–97; see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
42. But it is not alone. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Col-
orado initiative that precluded municipal antidiscrimination legislation to protect gays and
lesbians).
43. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442–46.
44. William D. Araiza, Was Cleburne an Accident?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 621, 647, 648
n.137 (2017). Tsai notes the second but not the first point. P. 97.
45. P. 138; see alsoHo Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546).
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validated on this ground as well as on the basis of its cruelty.46 A more con-
temporary example Tsai offers is felon disenfranchisement, which has a ra-
cially disproportionate effect on the eligible voter pool (p. 145). He might
have added the recently reinvigorated institution of solitary confinement,47
which (at least on the basis of presently available evidence) appears to have a
racially disparate distribution.48 These examples make apparent that Tsai has
a capacious understanding of cruelty that includes not just physical but also
dignitary harms.
Finally, Tsai points to the possibility that free speech claims can be em-
ployed as alternatives to equality claims. The argument here, in my view, is
best understood in slightly different terms from the earlier three examples
(although Tsai does not quite offer this distinction): It is not that free speech
is a direct substitute for equality. It is rather that free speech is a necessary
complement to equality claims. In part this is because the social fight for
equality requires advocacy and speech. Hence, Tsai’s leading example of the
fourth understudy is NAACP v. Button,49 which rejected on First Amend-
ment free speech grounds Virginia’s effort to regulate the NAACP out of ex-
istence as a way to defeat desegregation.50 The other examples that Tsai
provides—for example, a federal law that criminalizes encouragement of un-
lawful immigration (p. 202)—have the same function: It is not that their en-
forcement alone has any ameliorative effect on equality-related practices. It
is rather that they clear the channels of political communication, and so ena-
ble equality’s advocates to speak forthrightly and be heard by political allies.
In sum, Tsai purports to offer a toolkit for egalitarians that eschews both
the definitional quandaries and the terminology of equality talk as we have
long known it. Three of the four understudies that he proposes would oper-
ate as rough, presumably imperfect, substitutes. Although Tsai does not say
as much, his fourth alternative has a rather different function as an enabling
complement to equality-based arguments. In either capacity, though, his
analysis frames the following question: How successful will the understudies
be at doing the labor that under ordinary conditions would be done by
equality?
46. Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 255–57; see also pp. 137–40.
47. On the resurgence of solitary confinement in the 1990s, see KERAMET REITER, 23/7:
PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THERISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARYCONFINEMENT (2016).
48. See Samuel Fuller, Comment, Torture as a Management Practice: The Convention
Against Torture and Non-Disciplinary Solitary Confinement, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 102, 126 (2018)
(“The data that does exist indicates that the American prison system as a whole has a dispro-
portionate rate of solitary confinement among prisoners from racial minority groups, particu-
larly among black prisoners.”).
49. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
50. Pp. 185–87; see also Button, 371 U.S. at 444. On the context of massive resistance to
school desegregation in Virginia, see Robert H. Birkby & Walter F. Murphy, Interest Group
Conflict in the Judicial Arena: The First Amendment and Group Access to the Courts, 42 TEX. L.
REV. 1018, 1021–24 (1964).
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II. AWORLDWITHOUT EQUALITY?
At a moment of perceived retrenchment and rollback for those strug-
gling on behalf of historically and presently marginalized social groups, the
idea that the arsenal of equality can be deepened, and hence rendered more
effective, has obvious and powerful appeal for liberals and progressives. And
the force and allure of Tsai’s argument may be even more significant insofar
as it transcends the particulars of our present historical conjuncture. For it is
difficult to think of a period in history in which those who have power will-
ingly ceded it to the marginalized without either violence or the threat of
violence intervening.51 As a result, it is difficult to think of a moment when
claims for equality on behalf of a group that had been denied that entitle-
ment were embraced without conflict. Equality and its pursuit always have a
price. Conflict and the fragility of ensuing victories are constant handmaid-
ens of equality struggles, not exceptional conditions. If this diagnosis holds,
then Tsai’s proposals do not apply only in extraordinary moments of back-
sliding of the kind that some think characterize the United States circa 2019.
Rather, Tsai’s proposals would obtain across the board. This potential gener-
ality to Tsai’s claims on behalf of equality’s understudies makes a careful
analysis of their potency all the more pressing.
To evaluate Tsai’s claims, I pursue two argumentative tacks in this Part.
First, I consider whether there are general problems with the strategy of sub-
stituting some other value for equality. These general problems are unrelated
to Tsai’s specific election of understudies. Second, I examine more closely
the adequacy of his proposed substitutes. On both scores, I flag reasons to be
somewhat skeptical of the substitution strategy pursued in Practical Equality
and of the possibility that one can pursue the normative goals Tsai embraces
without some account of equality.
A. The Problematic Absence of Equality
To begin with, recall that Tsai does not follow Westen’s lead in wholly
abandoning equality as a regulative ideal.52 To the contrary, it continues to
play an organizing or architectural role in Tsai’s analysis.53 At the same time,
however, he does not provide a clear account of which notion of equality
matters or explain how that abstract notion is to be connected to the specific
proposals and tactical choices of and between equality’s understudies. As a
51. See Aziz Z. Huq, Democracy as Failure, 60 NOMOS (forthcoming 2020) (document-
ing the intimate connection between violence and both democracy’s birth and its subsequent
expansion). Note that by incorporating the threat of violence into this formulation, it encom-
passes the influential claim that democracy originates with elites’ concessions in the face of a
credible threat of popular violence. See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Did the
West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective, 115
Q.J. ECON. 1167 (2000).
52. See supra text accompanying note 36.
53. See, e.g., p. 40.
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result, it is simply not clear how the ideal of equality can or does serve as an
“overarching structure” (p. 40) when its essential quality and immediate im-
plications are unspecified.
To see the problems created by the lacuna, consider cases in which dif-
ferent claims of equality conflict. When this happens, the absence of a clear
specification of equality as an overall organizing principle creates a problem-
atic ambiguity in the normative implications of Tsai’s argument. For in-
stance, affirmative action disputes such as the one that has roiled Harvard54
might on one reading be characterized as conflicts between different claims
to equality. Roughly speaking, on one side is a claim to equal opportunity
simpliciter (at least along certain margins), and on the other side is a claim to
equal opportunity accounting for historical patterns of economic and social
stratification. I don’t see how any of Tsai’s substitutes help us think through
this conflict. Indeed, the one brief mention of affirmative action in Practical
Equality is elusive to the point of evasion.55 But I am not sure how one can
usefully think about affirmative action without acknowledging this conflict
of equalities.56
Or consider the problem of exclusionary or racist political leaders and
associated movements of the sort that have forcefully manifested in both Eu-
rope and the United States in the past few years, including Marine Le Pen,
Geert Wilders, and Norbert Hofer.57 Tsai recognizes that such movements
can be “a clear and present danger to liberalism” (p. 219). He warns, howev-
er, against “denying them liberties simply because of who they are” (p. 222).
But why? In fact, there is a long tradition of doing just that in Europe. Draw-
ing on the work of political scientist Karl Loewenstein on “militant democ-
racy,” the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany banned the quasi-Nazi
Socialist Reich Party in 1952 and the Communist Party of Germany in
1956.58 At least twenty-one other democracies have experimented with vari-
ous forms of party bans, with a range of results.59 In order to explain why
54. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.
55. See p. 22. In contrast, other important recent treatments of discrimination and ine-
quality have confronted the place of affirmative action in a general scheme of equality law. See,
e.g., KHAITAN, supra note 13, at 215–40.
56. That much commentary does not acknowledge the conflict is simply an indication
of its bad faith.
57. See, e.g., Katie Forster, Europe’s New Fascism? The Far-Right Leaders Hoping to Take
Power in 2017, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 15, 2016, 6:28 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news
/world/europe/marine-le-pen-geert-wilders-norbert-hofer-rise-of-fascism-europe-far-right-
leaders-donald-trump-a7417276.html [https://perma.cc/9CB8-XRB4]. For a discussion of the
general phenomenon from a legal and constitutional perspective, see Aziz Z. Huq, The People
Against the Constitution, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (2018) (reviewing JAN-WERNER MÜLLER,
WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016)).
58. Angela K. Bourne, Democratization and the Illegalization of Political Parties in Eu-
rope, 19 DEMOCRATIZATION 1065, 1067 tbl.1, 1073–74, 1080 (2012).
59. TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
170–71 (2018). Ginsburg and I express reservations about militant democracy, but on grounds
that are distinct from Tsai’s. We elaborate the tactical questions at stake in Aziz Z. Huq & Tom
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such measures are ruled out from equality’s toolkit, I think that one must do
more than merely suggest that they make “the pursuit of equality collapse[]
upon itself.”60 That did not happen in midcentury Germany. More is needed
to demonstrate that other polities will likely take a more destructive path.
The concern raised by such ambiguity would be minor if conflicts be-
tween variant formulations of equality were infrequent. But Rae has demon-
strated that such conflicts are pervasive. Indeed, a central implication of
Rae’s analysis is that for almost any given equality claim, the basic “gram-
mar” of equality means that there is typically some alternative claim that is
available in opposition to whatever equality argument one chooses to make.
Underscoring this dynamic, Rae makes the paradoxical observation that the
“one idea that is more powerful than order or efficiency or freedom in resist-
ing equality” is “equality itself.”61 So it is with Harvard’s efforts to fold in mi-
norities that have long been excluded; so it is with Elizabeth Warren’s wealth
tax proposal, which was parried in effect with the principle of equal oppor-
tunity.62 In the U.S. context, one especially important potential conflict arises
between race- and class-based conceptions of inequality, with white work-
ing-class interests often juxtaposed in something like a zero-sum contest
with those of minority communities.63 That is, the current moment of popu-
list resurgence is itself animated by a felt clash of equalities (even if it will not
often be articulated in those terms on the battlefield of daily politics).
Given this large domain of uncertainty, I think it is fair to say that Tsai
samples a number of egalitarian intuitions without explaining how they hang
together, or even whether some coherent normative vision can be found un-
derpinning their selection. To the extent that Practical Equality is read as a
political manifesto, this is not a problem: one is entitled to cobble together
whatever bundle of policies will appeal to one’s median voter. But to the ex-
tent that it is a more scholarly contribution, the absence is an acute one.
Without some account of what work equality’s understudies are supposed to
do, or a metric against which to evaluate them, it is simply unclear how
Tsai’s proposed alternatives can be assessed in the first place.
Uncertainty about where equality leads is compounded by a difficulty in
Tsai’s method for prescribing a route to get there. He occasionally refers to
his strategy as one of pursuing the “second best” (p. 91). His terminology re-
Ginsburg, Democracy Without Democrats, CONST. STUD. (forthcoming 2020) (analyzing the
role of timing in the tactics of democratic defense).
60. See p. 222.
61. RAE ET AL., supra note 11, at 150; id. at 138–40 (analyzing the “mutual exclusion”
arising when “equalities rule each other out”).
62. See Cowen, supra note 8.
63. See Alan Abramowitz & Jennifer McCoy, United States: Racial Resentment, Negative
Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump’s America, 681 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
137, 137–38 (2019) (arguing that a “reaction to the growing racial, ethnic, religious, and gender
diversity of the American electorate produced a surprising win for Donald Trump”); Marc
Hooghe & Ruth Dassonneville, Explaining the Trump Vote: The Effect of Racist Resentment and
Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, 51 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 528, 529–30 (2018) (similar findings).
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calls a well-known theorem in welfare economics entitled the “theory of the
second best.”64 Although Tsai might mean the term in a colloquial sense, the
technical theorem is illuminating too. In rough paraphrase, the theorem
holds that if one of the assumptions that support a social welfare–optimizing
policy fails, then one cannot simply make some small adjustment to account
for that failure.65 Rather, under second-best conditions, there will be deep
uncertainty over how best to advance social welfare.
To be sure, Tsai is not a welfarist, and so the theorem as originally speci-
fied is not directly applicable to his argument. Nevertheless, a form of the
second-best problem may be, mutatis mutandis, relevant to his analysis in
the following way: Tsai infers from the existence of current obstacles to
equality that it is better to tack toward equality’s understudies as a means to
more effectively ascend to reach a position of greater equality. Many of his
examples point to the possibility of short-term gains from this approach. But
it is far from clear that under the counterfactual conditions identified by
Tsai, short-term gains would translate into sustainable, long-term decreases
in inequality (even bracketing the vagueness of that term in Tsai’s analysis).
Here is the worry in a somewhat stylized form: The question is not simply
whether an equality understudy will generate an increase in equality-relevant
outcomes. It is also whether it will lock the system into that limited increase
and thereby make larger gains in the future infeasible.
Consider, by way of analogy, the role of regional trade agreements in
promoting global free trade. Regional treaties can promote trade between
signatory nations, but may increase the difficulty of achieving a global trade
settlement.66 It may work, that is, as a “local maximum” that impedes further
advances. Hence, advocates of greater global free trade must make a difficult
predictive calculation: Given the observed political economy of the world, is
a regional reform likely to yield a durable local maximum that precludes re-
forms with even bigger payoffs down the road?
Essentially the same predicament faces equality’s understudies: It may be
that an anticruelty rule or a pro–free speech rule has the effect of mitigating
some immediate effects of inequality. But by that very step, one might reduce
the urgency of more systemic equality-facing reforms, and thus retard the
larger mission of equality.67 Incrementalism is sometimes portrayed as an
especially potent reform strategy, but I suspect that its vitality is very much a
64. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.
STUD. 11, 11 (1956); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism,
100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 904–05 (2012) (discussing the theorem’s application to law).
65. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 64.
66. For a survey of debates on whether regional trade treaties inhibit global free trade,
see, for example, Caroline Freund & Emanuel Ornelas, Regional Trade Agreements, 2 ANN.
REV. ECON. 139 (2010).
67. Note that this should not be a problem for those who represent the immediate vic-
tims of inequality, who ought to prioritize their clients’ interests. For a fascinating discussion of
how this works in practice, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE. L.J. 470 (1976).
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contextual matter.68 To predict which pathway of legal or institutional re-
form ultimately yields the most egalitarian outcomes requires a difficult di-
agnosis of present and impending political conditions and outcomes. Tsai
does not undertake this political analysis. But without that work, it is diffi-
cult to know whether the short-term gains that he prefers are warranted by
the long-term trade losses adhering to egalitarian reform projects.69
But let us bracket these concerns for a moment. Let us say that there is
an adequate specification of equality, and also that we have in hand political
prognostications sufficiently clear to make unavoidable intertemporal trade-
offs. Even then, another obstacle remains. Tsai is not clear as to whether un-
derstudies will always be available for equality. And there is at least one do-
main of social organization in which their availability should not be taken
for granted. One of Scanlon’s accounts of equality takes the form of a princi-
ple of political fairness that “depends on the structure of the process through
which individual[ representatives] are chosen.”70 On Scanlon’s account, this
in turn requires “equal access to the means for attaining office and, more
generally, influencing policy through the electoral process.”71 But I doubt
that any of Tsai’s understudies can plausibly be involved as a substitute for
this species of equality. Rationality, for example, has not proved an adequate
means of preventing restrictions on the franchise, such as voter identifica-
tion requirements, that are sometimes motivated by discriminatory intent.72
Nor has rationality review mitigated whatever burden is imposed by voter
identification laws.73 (Interestingly, and contrary to Tsai’s thesis, some such
laws have fallen under equality review simpliciter.74) In the contemporary
68. For a nuanced treatment of incrementalism as a political strategy, see Saul Levmore,
Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 815 (2010).
69. Tsai expresses a concern that equality-focused litigation strategies risk the creation
of “tragic” precedents. P. 12. But a decision upholding a discriminatory policy without passing
clearly on an equality claim can be equally tragic. There is no reason a priori to think that the
incentive effects of a bad decision on equality grounds will be different from those from a bad
non-equality decision. The ultimate resolution of the travel ban case arguably has the latter
character, since the Court largely evaded the quality question. See Huq, supra note 7. Yet its
incentive effects in terms of future policy are likely the same as those generated by an equality-
facing decision.
70. SCANLON, supra note 13, at 77.
71. Id. at 80. But see Charles R. Beitz, Procedural Equality in Democratic Theory: A Pre-
liminary Examination, 25 NOMOS 69, 70–71 (1983) (doubting the moral standing of equal par-
ticipation rights).
72. E.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 219, 234 (4th
Cir. 2016) (invalidating a voter identification law as predicated on a racial motive), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
73. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185–204 (2008) (upholding the
Indiana state voter identification law against a facial challenge under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause).
74. See, e.g., McCrory, 831 F.3d at 219; Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 243–65 (5th Cir.
2016) (striking down the Texas state voter identification law as racially discriminatory under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
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American context, the frequent collinearity of race and partisan affiliation
creates a further difficulty because it will often be either unclear, or even pro-
foundly unknowable, whether a specific electoral measure was based on ra-
cial grounds, partisan grounds, or an inarticulate alloy of the two.75 Mere
“rationality” does not help us decide how to characterize the resulting com-
plex reality.
On the other hand, the fourth of Tsai’s understudies, free speech, can ac-
tually operate as an impediment to state efforts to facilitate equal access to
“influencing policy”76 through campaign finance reform legislation. Equality
is “not a legitimate objective of laws regulating campaign finance” under the
current jurisprudential dispensation.77 Because the motivating goal of cam-
paign finance reform since the Progressive Era has been the mitigation of
political distortions that inevitably result from social inequalities,78 free
speech concerns can often work at loggerheads with equality.79 It is difficult
to see at present any sort of complementarity of the kind evinced in NAACP
v. Button,80 let alone the prospect that free speech law can operate as a full-
blown substitute for an equality principle. Perhaps the best that can be
hoped for, as my colleague Genevieve Lakier has contended, is the possibility
of critique based on judges’ failure to “take serious account of economic, po-
litical, and social context” in First Amendment law.81 The relation between
such critique and the concrete prospect of reform, however, is sufficiently
etiolated at this moment of rampant formalism and empirical negligence as
to warrant a measure of pessimism.
I do not mean to exclude the possibility that there are other avenues of
reform—in effect, other “understudies”—that might be mobilized to egalitar-
ian ends in the electoral and political arenas. For example, Bertrall Ross has
recently developed a compelling argument that focuses not on rights but on
75. Compare Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1479 (2017) (treating race as a proxy for
party), with id. at 1496–97 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(positing a choice between race or party as a criterion of analysis).
76. SCANLON, supra note 13, at 80.
77. David A. Strauss, The Equality Taboo, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 509, 509.
78. The basic thought was expressed by Elihu Root in the speech that once elucidated
the jurisprudence. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957) (“The idea [behind
campaign finance restrictions] is to prevent . . . the great railroad companies, the great insur-
ance companies, the great telephone companies, the great aggregations of wealth from using
their corporate funds . . . to send members of the legislature . . . to vote for their protection and
the advancement of their interests . . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting Elihu Root,
The Political Use of Money (Sept. 3, 1894), in ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP
141, 143 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916))).
79. Michael S. Kang, The Brave New World of Party Campaign Finance Law, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 532 (2016) (“[The] Roberts Court . . . consistently strikes down nearly
every kind of campaign finance regulation it has reviewed, from aggregate contribution limits,
to restrictions on corporate electioneering, to public financing.”); id. at 547.
80. 371 U.S. 415 (1963); see supra note 50.
81. Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117, 2156 (2018).
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political empowerment as a response to inequality.82 But the larger thrust of
this Section remains, even accounting for those further alternatives: there are
domains of social and political activity in which Tsai’s understudies are inef-
fective or even counterproductive. This exacerbates the other concerns I
have flagged here—that Tsai’s argument demands a more specified concep-
tion of equality than the one he supplies, and that it provides no means for
resolving the pervasive conflicts between different forms of equality. Togeth-
er, all three hesitations should prompt caution about the threshold wisdom
of jettisoning the ideal of equality even before one reaches the substance of
Tsai’s specific understudies.
B. The Adequacy of the Understudies
Sometimes, a substitute performer is better than the real thing. I have,
for example, heard it said that the Chicago performance of Lin-Manuel Mi-
randa’s Hamilton is better than the version on Broadway in New York. (This
also strikes me as the sort of thing we midwesterners say to make ourselves
less envious.) For Tsai, however, the opposite problem arises: it is not clear
that his substitutes can do the work that he wants them to. This is so as a
matter of both practice and theory. And the worry holds whether one looks
across the four understudies or at each individually.
To begin with, it is relevant, but hardly decisive, to observe that there are
instances in which non-equality arguments have been lodged against policies
that are blatant engines of inequality and subordination—and have utterly
failed. For example, one of the threshold challenges to the Japanese Ameri-
can internment initiated in 1942 was framed on nondelegation grounds;
equal protection concepts took a backseat because of uncertainty as to
whether the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated an anti-
discrimination component.83 In Plessy v. Ferguson, similarly, the Court test-
ed the validity of Louisiana’s requirement of separate “white” and “colored”
railroad carriages by asking whether it was “reasonable, and . . . enacted in
good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance
or oppression of a particular class.”84 The Plessy Court rejected the argument
from reasonableness (Tsai’s second understudy) by stressing the epistemic
82. Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality in the Age of Citizens United, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1120, 1127 (2018) (“[A] more promising legal intervention would focus on incentivizing
political campaigns to mobilize the poor. Once campaigns target the poor in their mobilization
activities, representatives are likely to see the electorate in a less biased way, while experiencing
more pressure to adopt the redistributive policies necessary to ameliorate economic inequali-
ty.”).
83. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943) (identifying both nondelega-
tion- and discrimination-based challenges). But note that antidiscrimination norms at this
time had not been folded into federal constitutional law in any robust form. Michael J. Klar-
man, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 883 n.13 (1998).
84. 163 U.S. 537, 549–50 (1896).
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difficulty of drawing a conclusion against the state.85 Finally, in Williams v.
Mississippi, the Court upheld a suite of facially race-neutral restrictions that
the state had imposed on the franchise with the aim of excluding African
Americans because of the absence of a perfect fit between the regulated class
and race.86 At a minimum, these examples demonstrate that Tsai’s solution
is no global panacea. In some of the most crucial moments of egalitarian
struggle in U.S. history, equality’s understudies are just as disarmed as the
lead herself.
But this pattern of failures is also allied with a profound theoretical diffi-
culty. A central problem, running across all of his alternative tactics, is that
Tsai does not account for the possibility that the very forces that impede
equality’s progress would also (dare I say, perhaps, equally?) impede the path
of its understudies. Much of equality law has an implicit or explicit redis-
tributive coloration. The most immediately available solution to inequality,
after all, would seem to be a reallocation of some sort of resource from the
advantaged to the disadvantaged. Redistribution will be resisted predictably
by those who are already advantaged by the status quo.87 Anything else
would be surprising.
If the reason for resistance to equality claims rests upon a desire to not
see resources redistributed, it is unclear why an alternative means to the
same end would succeed where equality has failed. Why would a dominant
group, which is currently enjoying a disproportionate share of the status
quo’s harvest, not oppose equality’s understudies with as much fervor as they
resisted equality itself? Perhaps they will not realize the redistributive or cor-
rective force of those understudies in as crisp and clear a fashion as they rec-
ognize the force of equality claims? I am skeptical that it is easy to sneak
egalitarian redistribution past its opponents merely by draping it in a new
label. During periods of constitutional transition, for example, when there
are multiple legal issues up in the air and many means for redistributing re-
sources, studies suggest that powerful elites still in practice maintain tight
control over the extent of redistribution.88 There is little reason to think that
legal and constitutional conflict in the wake of a constitution’s creation
85. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51 (“[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even
requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnox-
ious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for
colored children in the District of Columbia . . . .”).
86. 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898) (“[T]he operation of the constitution and laws is not lim-
ited by their language or effects to one race. They reach weak and vicious white men as well as
weak and vicious black men . . . .”). Williams had argued that Mississippi law required that ju-
rors be qualified voters, yet the state’s suffrage criteria unconstitutionally excluded blacks. Id.
at 214.
87. RAE ET AL., supra note 11, at 148 (“[A]dvantaged groups do not act under an im-
pulse for self destruction.” (emphasis omitted)).
88. Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance During
Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 575, 577 (2013).
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would yield a different outcome.89 Elites are indeed more likely to be able to
identify covert efforts at redistribution because they would be dissimilar
from other forms of ordinary legislation. Even if that were not the case, the
enabling effect of a legal change’s low salience on the prospect of redistribu-
tion would be dissipated by Tsai’s book-length effort to draw attention to
equality’s alternatives. His interjection into public debates would therefore
have something of a self-defeating character.
The problem of obdurate political resistance to redistribution does not
improve if the reform does not transfer money or resources from one person
or group to another. Even if the law engages in leveling up, say by vesting a
subordinate group with costless legal rights such as citizenship or the fran-
chise, this might have the effect of depriving the superordinate group of rela-
tive standing or status engendered by the very fact of hierarchy. As Richard
McAdams has pointed out, race discrimination in the United States has his-
torically been “a means of producing group status.” It can serve that func-
tion, however, only if social hierarchies and “esteem-producing racial biases”
are sustained.90 McAdams’s powerful account suggests that progressive reor-
ganizations of status will meet fierce resistance even if there is no material
good at stake. Even efforts to erase status-based stratification, therefore, will
yield countermobilizations.
The concern I’ve expressed with the futility of substituting for equality is
rather abstract. It can be rendered more concrete, though, using Tsai’s own
examples. Consider again Plessy v. Ferguson.91 According to Tsai, the “path
not taken” in Plessy hinged on an argument from what is today called the
dormant commerce clause—that is, the notion that a discriminatory state
regulation of railcars fell outside the reserved powers of the states and in-
stead fell within an exclusive federal domain pursuant to the Commerce
Clause (pp. 45–47). But Plessy’s majority explicitly rejected that argument,92
just like it rejected the argument from reasonableness.93 Worse, even on
those occasions that the Court was asked to invalidate railroad legislation
based on overt racial bias, it continued to find ways to duck the question as
late as the 1940s.94
89. Consider, for instance, post–Eastern bloc Hungary, which has experience a rapid
democratic decline that courts have been unable to hinder. János Kornai, Hungary’s U-Turn:
Retreating from Democracy, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 34, 36 (2015).
90. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1008, 1064 (1995).
91. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
92. Id. at 548 (“In the present case no question of interference with interstate commerce
can possibly arise, since the East Louisiana Railway appears to have been purely a local line,
with both its termini within the State of Louisiana.”).
93. See supra text accompanying note 85.
94. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstaining rather
than ruling on an equal protection challenge to a Texas rule prohibiting African American por-
ters).
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Finally, it is worth drilling down on the specifics of Tsai’s understudies
to query whether they in fact can perform the same work on the ground as
equality. I have already registered a concern that First Amendment free
speech doctrine as currently configured is more hostile to than facilitative of
equality concerns.95 So I am unconvinced that present free speech doctrine
will have any egalitarian effect—and a radical refashioning of the doctrine is
presently implausible.96 Building on elements of the analysis so far, I will
therefore focus on Tsai’s due process and anticruelty proposals to suggest
that they will not suffice to play the role that Tsai hopes them to fulfill.
Take first the idea of due process.97 At least under present doctrine, this
principle has force only if the government acts in a way that is discretely tar-
geted at a specific person, and not if it alters legal entitlements through a
general law.98 Accordingly, much state action that might impinge on (some
understanding of) equality does not impinge on the domain covered by due
process. Even where due process does apply, it is hardly clear that it can sup-
ply an alternative to equality concerns. Focusing on criminal justice, Tsai
suggests that due process can do the work of preventing state officials from
“using outrageous and unreliable methods” (pp. 72–73). But at least so far as
criminal justice goes, among the most inegalitarian elements of current prac-
tice is the power to stop and search pedestrians without probable cause, a
power that the Warren Court explicitly blessed. The ensuing “stop and frisk”
tactic, when applied unevenly across different geographic areas with varying
racial geographies, solidifies existing racial stratification and perhaps even
exacerbates the extent of such inegalitarian layering.99 Due process norms do
little to impede the use of tactics that are legally and factually justified in the
95. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81.
96. For an argument that the Court treats disfavored speakers differently, and with less
care, than favored speakers, see Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and
Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012).
97. At times, Tsai uses the idea of “procedural justice.” P. 67. This term is now associat-
ed with Tom Tyler’s theory of legal compliance. See TOM R. TYLER, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
DESIGN OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 37–41 (2007) (defining procedural justice). But procedural
justice so defined is not necessarily a substitute for equality. The thrust of Tyler’s theory is that
manifestations of procedural justice increase the tendency of those who interact with state ac-
tions to comply subsequently with the law. TOM R. TYLER& YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 49–58 (2002) (discuss-
ing the role of procedural justice in causing people to accept third-party decisions). But an in-
creased willingness to obey the law is not the same as more equal or more just treatment. Much
depends, rather, on the content of the substantive law.
98. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner
v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
99. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk
as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2409–12 (2017) (arguing against the
use of street stops, even if legal, on the basis of their racially stratifying effects); cf. pp. 64–65.
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individual case, like stop and frisk, but that have the effect, when applied in
the aggregate, of increasing the extent of pernicious forms of inequality.100
Or consider Tsai’s suggestion that McCleskey v. Kemp101 might have
turned out differently had it been argued on due process grounds focusing
on the standardless discretion exercised by district attorneys in Georgia
bringing capital charges (pp. 87–88). If the Court had taken that path, how-
ever, the problems of racial bias and disproportionality in the application of
the death penalty would have remained unaddressed. It would not have been
a “second-best response to concerns of political backlash” as Tsai suggests
(p. 91), but rather a precisely tailored fix that may have helped McCleskey
and no other defendant. It is simply unknowable whether a more formal
standardization of prosecutorial decisions to seek a capital sentence would
have led to greater or lesser inequality. For all we know, under such counter-
factual conditions, a rigid rule in lieu of a flexible standard could have elimi-
nated whatever discretionary mercy then existed in this part of the Georgia
criminal justice system.102 Worse, we cannot know whether a more robust
due process doctrine would not have led to a similar political and jurispru-
dential backlash. There is reason to think it would indeed have had this ef-
fect. For even before McCleskey was decided, influential arguments were
made against the federal judiciary’s enforcement of constitutional norms re-
lated to fair criminal trials through the writ of postconviction habeas.103
Finally, I am not convinced by Tsai’s assertion that due process viola-
tions will be easier to prove than bad motive (p. 70). Often, it will be just as
hard to show procedural irregularities in the opaque context of criminal jus-
tice as it is to demonstrate bad intent. In any adjudicative system character-
ized by informality, similar difficulties will arise. Even where process is more
formalized (such as at the trial stage of criminal adjudication), there will of-
ten be loosely regulated decision points at which unequal treatment of simi-
larly situated litigants might emerge without any ready means of scrutiny or
regulation. In practice, litigants will often lack the resources or procedural
means to show that similarly situated individuals were treated differently
from them. Absent some comparative data, a claim of per se improper pro-
cess may well founder.
Alternatively, consider anticruelty norms as a substitute for equality. As
of April 2019, a majority of the Court had flipped from solicitude about the
100. For instance, algorithmic bail and sentencing tools can have racial stratification ef-
fects even if they are accurate (in the sense of having low rates of false positives and false nega-
tives). Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019).
101. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
102. That said, increased discretion in the federal criminal sentencing system has led to
more rather than less racial inequality. See Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Dispari-
ties Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268,
1333 (2014).
103. The locus classicus of this concern was an influential, albeit highly flawed, article by
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 452–53 (1963).
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risk that innocent defendants may be executed to a positive hunger for a rap-
id delivery of the ultimate punishment.104 This dynamic has already generat-
ed a sharp and public complaint from the usually mild-tempered Justice
Breyer.105 Whatever one makes of this hungry judicial embrace of death, it is
hardly compatible with the potency of anticruelty as a value in lieu of equali-
ty. More generally, it is far from clear that we are equally empathetic to all
manifestations of suffering without regard to the identity of the person
claiming that experience. The American Medical Association, for example,
cautions that physicians tend to believe that “Hispanic and African Ameri-
can patients experience less severe pain than whites, when in fact they report
comparable pain.”106 If physicians trained in the diagnosis of physical pain
systematically misrecognize the pain of (nonwhite) others, it would be aston-
ishing to find that judges, legislators, or members of the general public per-
formed better. To the contrary, there is every reason to expect that a reliance
on empathy, which is the basis of the anticruelty norm, will reproduce a
stratified titration of care and remediation across superordinate and subor-
dinate social groups.
To summarize, both an analysis of the possibility of substituting for
equality in the abstract and a close scrutiny of the specific understudies pro-
posed by Tsai reveal a host of difficulties. There is no reason to think that
equality’s understudies will have a path that is substantially less onerous than
equality itself to a more equitable set of social arrangements. In their particu-
lars, moreover, Tsai’s understudies seem now to be either orthogonal to or at
odds with equality concerns (e.g., free speech and due process) or under-
whelming, simply inefficacious substitutes (e.g., due process and anticruel-
ty). I am thus not convinced that equality talk can or should be abandoned
anytime soon.
III. WHY EQUALITY (AGAIN)?
So we return once more to the obdurately complex and occasionally fu-
gitive ideal of equality. The force of Tsai’s threshold bill of particulars against
the concept remains: Equality is an idea that seems to do as much as political
rhetoric to preserve the status quo ante of educational and status privilege
(the Harvard case), white national identity (the travel ban case), and eco-
nomic inequality (the wealth tax) as it does to mitigate visceral social divi-
104. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019) (“If litigation is allowed to
proceed, federal courts ‘can and should’ protect settled state judgments from ‘undue interfer-
ence’ by invoking their ‘equitable powers’ to dismiss or curtail suits that are pursued in a ‘dila-
tory’ fashion or based on ‘speculative’ theories.” (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573,
584–85 (2006))).
105. See Adam Liptak, Over 3 A.M. Dissent, Supreme Court Says Alabama Execution May
Proceed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/us/politics
/supreme-court-alabama-execution-.html [https://perma.cc/9DHD-AWE2].
106. Ronald Wyatt, Pain and Ethnicity, 15 A.M.A. J. ETHICS 449, 451 (2013).
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sions and yawning gaps in life-cycle opportunities.107 When Tsai complains
that “we can’t solve any real problems at [a high] level of generality” (p. 38),
he is effectively and precisely diagnosing a core problem in equality. Its in-
ternal pluralism is rendered inevitable by what Rae calls an implicit “gram-
mar” that allows for many different equality claims to be made by altering
the comparator groups, the traits being compared, and the baseline of enti-
tlements in the world.108 Yet equality parades across the public stage as if it
were a self-evident truth.
Rather than turning away from equality, though, I think the more prof-
itable pathway is the one suggested in Elizabeth Anderson’s essay What Is
the Point of Equality?109 Anderson’s compelling response is that to champion
equality is to seek “to end oppression” through the “construction of a com-
munity of equals” that “integrates principles of distribution with the expres-
sive demands of equal respect.”110 Or take instead Tarun Khaitan’s eloquent
recent formulation of discrimination law’s aim as the promotion of human
flourishing by “reduc[ing] . . . pervasive, abiding, and substantial relative dis-
advantage between certain types of groups.”111 To be sure, these definitions
require more specification of what counts as “oppression” or when it is legit-
imate for a certain social group to be subject to abiding “disadvantage.” But
by asking why we have recourse to the ideal of equality—a question that did
not occur to political thinkers for many centuries112—Anderson and Khaitan
provide an orienting lodestar to sift disputes about affirmative action, the ex-
clusion of national or religious groups from the polity, or the effort to reduce
a nation’s Gini coefficient. They show the point, and not just the form, of
equality. This orientation provides not just prescriptive guidance but also a
foundation for critique. Most obviously, when the Court sententiously pro-
pounds syllogisms such as “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,” it offers a vantage point
from which to critique the vacuity, pomposity, and even hypocrisy of such
an assertion when made in a context of persistent racial stratification and
calls for white supremacy.113
Of course, this is not the only possible account of equality’s ambition.114
I invoke it here because I think its substance is persuasive, not because I
think that merely invoking it is enough to persuade. The hard work of equal-
ity, though, is in the public and juridical exposition of these ambitions, and
107. See supra text accompanying notes 1–9.
108. RAE ET AL., supra note 11, at 15.
109. Anderson, supra note 33.
110. Id. at 288–89.
111. KHAITAN, supra note 13, at 18.
112. FLEISCHACKER, supra note 17, at 2.
113. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
114. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011)
(“The end of traditional equality jurisprudence, however, should not be conflated with the end
of protection for subordinated groups.”).
April 2020] Equality’s Understudies 1051
in their defense against alternatives. It is only through such arguments, and
through the proffering of contentions about which ambition is more faithful
to our constitutional traditions and moral compasses, that the fight for
equality really is pursued. Laying down arms is not an invitation to an un-
derstudy. It rather risks abandoning one important rhetorical and conceptu-
al field to equality’s opponents.
Yet even if I demur to his ultimate recommendation, Tsai has done an
important service by clarifying the intimate connections between equality, at
least understood in a certain way, and related normative concepts. By asking
why equality matters, he invites a more searching inquiry into a social and
legal norm that is recklessly invoked and rarely explicated with care or good
faith. No such criticism can be made of Tsai’s work. Rather, at a time of in-
creasing anxiety about prejudice, tolerance, and the possibility of realizing a
decent society (either for us, or for the next generation), this is an important
and worthwhile enterprise, albeit one that should be understood as comple-
mentary to, and not a substitute for, the deeper and longer fight over equali-
ty.
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